

THE MAKING OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

The **image** represents a message transmitted of one individual to another. It can be about gender, minorities or ethnic groups or countries. **Image** or reputation describes the way in which a country and its policies may be perceived by others. **Images** are powerful political statements... they may be transmitted by the use of words. ⁽¹⁾ “The **image** of a person needs to be recognized as a positive one. So are countries which are made up of people and are run by political elites. Historically, political leaders have recognized that **images** matter.”⁽²⁾

This study endeavors to discuss how Western press portrays the Egyptian Revolution and accordingly affect policy-making. Imperatively, the majority of the people have no chance to personally see what a foreign country is like but they see **images** of these countries in the media. Mass media have always been responsible for **image** building and formulating public opinion. Particularly, newspapers have constantly been labeled for their authenticity and; hence, they affect people’s attitudes concerning a country’s local and international affairs. Newspapers do not only transmit information, but they have also become a tool directing people and creating their ideological, political and social dispositions. Newspapers play a pertinent role in shaping, formulating and impacting public opinion and, consequently, a country’s decision-makers’ policies.

KEYWORDS: Egyptian Revolution

INTRODUCTION

The importance of newspapers as **image** carriers has become indispensable due to their ability to portray individuals, groups and nations in a positive or negative way or in whatever manner they wish.

An **image** of a country by others is very important as an indicative of how this country can be viewed in the eyes of another; whether favorably, unfavorably or even stereotyped. Stereotyping is a cognitive component or a set of beliefs about a certain group, wherein particular traits are believed to characterize the whole group. They reflect beliefs what we

⁽¹⁾Michael Frendo, President of Malta’s Foreign Affairs Commission to open CEPIC Congress, in a speech about *The Politics of Image*, delivered in Malta on June 4, 2008. He cited a visual **image** of Mahatma Gandhi arriving accompanied by a goat at 10 Downing Street or collecting sea water after walking for miles in a public appearance to oppose law of salt production.

⁽²⁾Jianqing Wu, "An Empirical Study of Stereotyped **Images** of China in American Media, School of Foreign Languages, Qingdao University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China," *Journal of Language Teaching and Research*, 1, no. 6 (2010), pp. 913-917. Barbara Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 319, 322-23 (2001) in “The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links. Between Passion, Empathy, and Power,” Mary Becker. *William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law*, Vol.8. Issue 1, Article 2.

presume EVERY member of that group is like. ⁽³⁾

The effects of stereotyping on public opinion have been understudied by scholars; however, we can still get some idea of the major impact stereotyping may have on public opinion outcomes. Notably, political knowledge and culture does have its impact on shaping the **image** of other people or countries. ⁽⁴⁾ The fact remains that if an **image** problem is left unaddressed, the country under investigation can pay a dear price. ⁽⁵⁾ In times of crises, a country's **image** may be reflected in such a manner that affects its relationship with other countries. Fortunately, **image** repair is possible through a restoration discourse, suggests Benoit. ⁽⁶⁾ "When a face has been threatened, face-work must be done," stresses Goffman. ⁽⁷⁾

This study aims at examining the image of the Egyptian Revolution which was consecutively carried out on January 25, 2011 and on June 30, 2013 as portrayed by British and American newspapers in order to realize two main purposes: First, it attempts to discover the image of the Egyptian Revolution in British and American newspapers in its dynamic condition rather than its static condition in order to study the developments and/or changes between them. Rather what frames have the selected papers placed in the Egyptian Revolution. Second, this study aims at developing academic research in studying international relations of two major countries like the U.K. and the U.S. regarding Egypt so that the latter can benefit from the content analysis as a tool in testing hypotheses both quantitatively and qualitatively. The study postulates a main hypothesis: What image did British and American newspapers portray for the Egyptian Revolution and how consistent or inconsistent were their views?

LITERATURE REVIEW

When the Egyptian Revolution erupted on January 25th, 2011 demanding to topple Hosni Mubarak regime, the world was startled by its intense flotilla with demonstrators surging under the banner 'Selmeya' (peaceful). The events which occurred during the revolution prompted mixed reactions worldwide regarding its repercussions and on who would

⁽³⁾ Barbara Reskin, *The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination*, 29 *CONTEMP. Soc.* 319, p.914.

⁽⁴⁾ N.Salem, "*Thoret Al-Arab wa Al-Israeleen fi Al-Welayat Al-Motaheda Al-Amerikeya*," (The **Image** of Arabs and Israelis in the United States of America) p.13. The **image** portrayed by the Russians for the Polish is entirely different from the **image** they view of the Americans – a notion that proves that knowledge of the political culture of certain people has its impact on how others view them.

⁽⁵⁾ Muzaffar, "Prejudiced Portrayal of Muslims Serves Interests of Western Elites." Muzaffar posits that the U.S. is dominated by the Zionist lobby and that is why it cannot adopt an independent foreign policy; its relationships and interactions with other countries. Eventually, the U.S. along with various Western countries such as the U.K., France and Germany will extend their support to Israel despite Palestinian resistance of Israeli occupation and aggression based on the latter's projecting the Palestinians as the wrongdoers; a justifiable **image**. This is simply because "the prejudiced portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the media serves the interests of the centers of power in the West." Notably, Malaysia is complemented for being a functioning democracy whose political succession has been smooth. During regime changes, the matter may even be more critical as the country may be subject to closeness or alienation by other countries according to its political regime. Iran sets a tragic example of a country that tries to safeguard its independence as a sovereign state who has not succumbed to the hegemon – U.S. – and its allies. The fact that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program reflects why it had been sanctioned economically for the past 33 years.

⁽⁶⁾ William L. Benoit & Anne Czerwinski, *A Critical Analysis of USAir's Image Repair Discourse*, *Business Communication Quarterly*, 60 (3), p. 38. **Image** Restoration Strategies include: Denial, Evasion of responsibility, Reduction of offensiveness, Corrective action and Mortification. Though **image** repair strategies may not always work well together; hence, the accused of wrong-doing may select one or more of these strategies to redress the distorted **image**.

⁽⁷⁾ Ibid, cited from E. Goffman, "*Interaction ritual*," (New York: Anchor Books: 1967).

actually lead +Egypt.

Studies tackled the factors that led to the success of the January 25th Revolution as follows: First, it managed to topple Mubarak's regime and end the 'hereditaryscenario' of passing Egypt's rule to his son, Gamal Mubarak. Second, it foundered a wide segment of corrupted businessmen who managed to accumulate their wealth on the basis of nepotism and favoritism. They acted as parasites who manipulated government institutions through controlling the infamous National Democratic Party (NDP). Finally, this revolution rid the society from the political influence of police security that deviated from its original role of protecting the state and society as opposed to securing the ruler on the expense of the people. ⁽⁸⁾

CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE REVOLUTION

Mubarak had monopolized his authority and wealth to create a personal state or absolute rule. He had installed a police state that started in the wake of November 17, 1997 Luxor Massacre, precisely with Mubarak posting 3Habib Al-Adly as Egypt's Interior Minister. Previously heading up the State Security Investigations, Al-Adly turned the country into a police state dominated by state security as an octopus over the entire government. ⁽⁹⁾

Mubarak's era had witnessed an unprecedented amount of corruption that came to be institutionalized. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Egypt's **image** appears to be likened to Swedish economist and sociologist Karl Gunnar Myrdal's theory of the 'softstate'; a state that passes laws but doesn't enforce them. Elites' power protects them from laws. Also, those who pay bribes can get away from these laws. To Myrdal, a soft state leads to poverty and backwardness and corruption becomes a way of life. ⁽¹¹⁾ Mubarak resorted to co-opting and controlling all institutions starting from the parliament, media, military, police, and judiciary to civil society. ⁽¹²⁾

Eventually, 2005 parliamentary elections constituted a test of political reform that was aborted ⁽¹³⁾ with the

⁽⁸⁾Tarek Al-Bishri, "Men AwrakThawret 25 Yanayer" (Papers from January 25th Revolution), (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk: 2011),pp. 11-12.

⁽⁹⁾Ashraf Khalil, "LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation," (Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press: 2012), p. 27. According to Wiki leaks diplomatic cables between the U.S. State Department and Egyptian Embassy, former Ambassador to Cairo Margaret Scobey expressed her "impression that Mubarak trusted Al-Adly to maintain order and control and did not ask too many questions as long as he delivered results." But how much did Mubarak know or cared about the day-to-day behavior of Al-Adly's ministry posits a question.

⁽¹⁰⁾Galal Amin,"Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011," (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press: 2011), pp. 34-43. According to Dr. Amin, professor of Economics at the American University in Cairo and author of "Whatever Happened to the Egyptians," corruption may be linked to the 1967 defeat which was a decisive incident in Egypt's history as it was not only a military, political and economic disaster.

⁽¹¹⁾ Amin, "Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011," p.8.

⁽¹²⁾Abdel HalimKandil, "Al Ayam al Akheera" (The Final Days), (Cairo: Dar al Thakafa al Gadida: 2008) pp. 61-62. In fact, Parliament Member TalaatEsmat El Sadat was tried in front of a military court which sentenced him to one year in prison as punishment for his suggestion – during a 2005 parliamentary session – of setting a constitutional condition for the age of the elected president that should be older than the son Gamal Mubarak and younger than the father Hosni Mubarak; a claim that he paid a dear price for.

⁽¹³⁾Abdel-Latif Al-Menawy, "Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom," (The Last Days of Mubarak's regime: 18th Days)2nd Ed. (Cairo: al-Dar al-Masria al-Lebnania: 2012),pp. 19-20. When the regime and the ministry of interior felt that the NDP is losing in 2005 parliamentary elections they got involved in the 2nd and 3rd rounds, rigged the results to maintain their victory in parliament despite judicial supervision.

sidelining of the most organized political party, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

Moreover, the devastating results of the November 28, 2010 parliamentary elections gave the NDP unprecedented majority which was suspected as being fraudulent. The **image** of every Egyptian government portrayed 'cheating and rigging elections' since it "couldn't stomach the uncertainty of a fair vote." ⁽¹⁴⁾ Eventually, **image** of Mubarak's Egypt reflected a clamped down on journalists. The government also left no opposition press and concocted a crisis to shut it down.

Mubarak appeared to be completely absent when a serious crisis faced Egypt, one requiring major decisions, ⁽¹⁵⁾ meanwhile, appointing a vice president; an important matter, had always been a closed issue according to Mubarak. And when asked about the reason for not having a vice president, he explained that he did not want to force some president on the Egyptians. ⁽¹⁶⁾

Mubarak appears to have missed out on a lot of opportunities for real progress. He seemed to be 'evacuating' Egypt from all distinguished persons; civilian or military officials, to remain the one and only leader. ⁽¹⁷⁾

With the frenzy state of affairs, a revolution appeared to be in the making. Why Egyptians did not revolt earlier and whether they were responsible for creating a dictator or not; a question that preoccupied a lot of researchers and academics. According to MB party leader Abdel Mawgoud Al-Dardery, Egyptians resistance began in 1798 with Napoleon's invasion and then in 1882 in response to British invasion of Egypt. However, due to internal voices calling Egypt to take European direction rather than the Islamic direction as expressed in the writings of Egyptian Thinker Taha Hussein, Al-Dardery contends that Egypt's 2011 revolution was the first opportunity for Egyptians to finally answer collectively and to adopt the Islamic formula. ⁽¹⁸⁾ But why precisely Egyptian youth took to the streets demanding to topple the government? Despite the economic growth Egypt had witnessed during the late '90s, the government's narrow social base could only reap the fruits of economic prosperity resulting in marginalizing the remaining large segments of the society. Indeed, unemployment among university degree youth reached 9.7%. Additionally, the gap between the rich and

⁽¹⁴⁾ Khalil, "*LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*", p. 90. Khalil recalls his meeting with Ibrahim Essa, the longtime maverick *Al-Dostour* Editor who represented a gadfly to the regime as he described the November 28, 2010 elections being "a fiasco resulting in a society incapable of reform".

⁽¹⁵⁾ Amin, "*Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011*," p. 148. Indeed, Mubarak's absence could be felt during American or British attack on Iraq, Israel's attack on Lebanon, sinking of Salam Ferry carrying hundreds of Egyptians or a train catching fire as a result of absolute negligence.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Al-Menawy, "*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*," (The Last Days of Mubarak's regime: 18th Days) pp. 204-206. Ironically, Mubarak expressed his pessimism based on a fortune-teller's malediction, "the moment you appoint a vice president will bring about your end." His spouse, Suzan Mubarak, appeared to have intervened in the issue by standing against having Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy, former Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt (SCAF) or Omar Suleiman, former Director of Egypt's General Intelligence Service [and later chosen as his vice president], approaching the Mubarak's narrow circle, which she felt would endanger 'family rule'.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Ahmed Al-Moslemany, "*Misr al Kobra*" (Egypt the Great), (Cairo: Kian Corp for Publishing, distribution & Printing "Dar Laila": 2012), p. 92.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Eric Trager, "The Muslim Brotherhood's 213-Year Revolution," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. February 15, 2013. Accessed November 21, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org. The Islamic formula, emphasizes Al-Dardery, the Brotherhood's approach ultimately considers western values – political secularism and pluralism – as imports against which Egyptians have been fighting for 213 years.

poor became enormous. ⁽¹⁹⁾ Furthermore, the pervasiveness of human rights abuses fueled the revolution besides lack of tolerance with minorities was another factor that prompted a lot of Egyptian discontent. ⁽²⁰⁾

A LEADERLESS REVOLUTION & THE EMERGENCY LAW MARTYR

What made the Egyptian Revolution so special is the fact that it was carried out by peaceful youth using new state-of-the-art technology: the internet; mainly *Facebook*. However, making a virtual world a reality became absolutely possible by bloggers who simply clicked 'YES' to a call for demonstrations against police brutality, poverty, corruption and unemployment under the banner: '**We Are AllKhaled Said**'. ⁽²¹⁾ Said's death marked the beginning of protests that eventually brought down the regime in Egypt. "His name became a touchstone, symbolic of the decades-long excesses of the Egyptian police state under the emergency laws." ⁽²²⁾ Debatably, Said's death posits a question of whether Mubarak would still be president today if he had simply gotten ahead of the issue and at least understood that his political self-interest demanded a robust response. Said was labeled as the Emergency Law Martyr. ⁽²³⁾ Imperatively, *civilsociety* rallied the case of 'Khaled Said' and helped in spreading awareness among people regarding their freedom, human rights and social justice. ⁽²⁴⁾

Few studies tackled *slogans* displayed during the revolution. ⁽²⁵⁾ January 25th Revolution demonstrators called for '*bread, freedom and social justice*'. Nevertheless, they opted to raise their demands ceiling due to; first, failure of Mubarak's regime in responding to their main demand in an open dialogue. Second, the tardy time factor in facing the

⁽¹⁹⁾ NohaBakr, The Egyptian Revolution, "Monika Wolfeld, MEDAK, Malta."(2012)

⁽²⁰⁾ Khalil, "*LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*", p. 183. One tragic event was the massacre of 23 Coptic Christians on New Year's Eve in 2011 of the Church of Kidissen (Two Saints) in Alexandria at the hands of terrorists; an incident that was never fully investigated and whose culprits were never brought to justice. (In fact, the complete secrecy that beset how the government handled these cases in bringing culprits into justice added more insult to injury). Additionally, discrimination against the Baha'is faith and ethnic minorities (Nubians and Sinai Bedouins) prompted further discontent.

⁽²¹⁾ SaharKhamis and Katherine Vaughn "We are All Khaled Said": The Potentials and Limitations of Cyber-activism in Triggering Public Mobilization and Promoting Political Change. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research*. July 2011. Khaled Said is an Alexandrian froufrou young man and member of the elite who was brutally killed by police officers as he "had possession of a video showing police selling illegal drugs."

⁽²²⁾ Khalil, "*LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*", p. 71. Khalil questions, "What if Mubarak had recognized the depth and breadth of the popular anger on display, and ordered a proper investigation of the Said's case?"

⁽²³⁾ John D. Sutter, The Faces of Egypt's 'Revolution 2.0', "CNN LABS." February 21, 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/> Dressed in black, Said's demonstrators organized silent vigils by standing in a long line on the Alexandria Corniche while Caireens did the same along the Nile in Giza. This was how protestors made a statement. Khaled Said represented an issue that unified Egyptian youth against police torture and human rights abuses. And when the Egyptian government shut down the internet during the protests, people went to the street and spread the revolution by word of mouth.

⁽²⁴⁾ AmanyKandil, "*Athawrawa al Mugtama'a al Madani*" (The Revolution and Civil Society) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), p. 137.

⁽²⁵⁾ Adel Abdel Sadek, "*Shea'ratThawret 25 Yanayer: Kera'a fi al Maghzawa al Delalat*" (Slogans of the January 25th Revolution: Their Meanings & Connotations) Dr. AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp. 197-213. Slogans displayed had their own distinctive features as they were always in colloquial Arabic and were never as sharp as that final one used during the January 25th Revolution: 'People Demand to Topple the Regime'.

crisis complicated matters rather than pacified protestors. By all accounts, Mubarak's response was described as being 'too late yielding too little'. Third, the regime failed to establish a new legal political system to satisfy peoples' demands except a few segments in the society. In fact, Mubarak regime could be described as being 'exclusive' rather than 'inclusive'. Finally, it was a mistake to perceive 'change' as a negative concept that brings instability to societies. ⁽²⁶⁾

Interestingly, the structure of the *political forces* post the January 25th Revolution as mainly five forces: security forces, the military, political parties, NDP remnants, protestors and the silent majority; the 'Kanaba party' or (Sofa party). Despite their lack of participation in demonstrations, the 'Sofa party's casting their votes for candidates shall eventually shape Egypt's future.

Security Forces' during the demonstrations had applied the 'Drying Sources Theory' However, when the 'Drying Sources Theory' did not pay off police resorted to using thugs and outlaws besides elements of security forces in civilian clothes in order to disperse protestors. ⁽²⁷⁾ Eventually, the **image** of a brutal police persisted and was consolidated by its utilization of thugs during the revolution; an act that have led to its own destruction.

Extensive literature tackled the *military's* performance as taking a different turn with Mubarak's ouster. The deployment of SCAF in the city center strengthened its **image** as the controller of events. ⁽²⁸⁾ Eventually, many people understood the gesture being "the first sign that Mubarak and his military were not on the same page." ⁽²⁹⁾

As for *parliament members* and the *Shura Council*, their performance had been crooked. Their members expressed their dismay and refusal of the revolution claiming that protestors represent a 'few involved' following an internal and external agenda aiming to topple the regime. ⁽³⁰⁾ While some political parties refused to participate in the demonstrations, others got involved like *Al-Ghadparty*. Noticeably, the MB disappeared completely from the scene claiming that January

⁽²⁶⁾Alaa Salem, "Athar Thawret 25 Yanayerala al Mantekah al Arabiya" (Repercussions of January 25th Revolution on the Arab Region) Dr. Amr Hashem Rabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp. 285-287.

⁽²⁷⁾Assem Guinedi, "Adaa' a Gehaz al Shorta" (Role Played by Police Security) Dr. Amr Hashem Rabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp.163-172. This theory posits that police first starts by cancelling metro stops in stations that receive heavy traffic of protestors. Second, police shuts down all roads leading to designated protest areas. Third, police blockades all areas by a tactic called 'men's rope' that tightens grips on protestors until they request an exit, after which, they are allowed to exit one by one every 10 minutes, per se. The catch: everyone leaving the area gets arrested and boards a vehicle designated for that purpose. In response to that strategy, the protestors have used 'Proponents Exhaust Theory' by applying hit and run tactics forcing military squads to stay up for three consecutive days in all governorates.

⁽²⁸⁾Al-Bishri, "Men Awrak Thawret 25 Yanayer" (Papers from January 25th Revolution) pp. 18-19. SCAF had to step in and fill that vacuum when it announced a meeting on February 10, 2011 without its supreme leader at the time, Hosni Mubarak. In his initial statement, Army Chief-General Hussein Tantawi acknowledged the legitimacy of the people's demands and confirmed that the military's loyalty goes to the Egyptian people.

⁽²⁹⁾Khalil, "LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation," p. 211.

⁽³⁰⁾Abdalla Saleh, "Adaa' a al Parlaman" (The Performance of Parliament) Amr Hashem Rabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), p. 106.

25th was an official holiday and whoever would like to participate in the protests could do it individually. ⁽³¹⁾ Yet, the Minister of Interior, supported by the government, directly attacked the MB as being the planner who orchestrated the demonstrations. Nevertheless, this plan backfired and instead drove the MB to kidnap the protests and stifle the youth movement by seizing the opportunity to contact its branches worldwide seeking their international support and solidarity in obtaining political power in Egypt. ⁽³²⁾ It was only when the desperate MB followed the advice of a 'liberalist' – who had strong ties with the former regime – to make use of the media in strengthening its hold and in portraying a favorable **image**, it would win over. ⁽³³⁾

Eventually, MB's performance in the revolution and the nature of its relationship with the military has been characterized by vagueness since it appeared in the front lines showing its control of events then it marched backward until it re-appeared in other events. ⁽³⁴⁾ Notwithstanding the MB claimed that "monopolizing the revolution by any one particular party means the demise of the January 25th, 2011 Revolution." ⁽³⁵⁾ Egypt's Leading Political Scientist Dr. Hala Mustafa posited that when the MB realized that they could finally control the demonstrations, they seized the opportunity and joined the protesters. ⁽³⁶⁾ Little did the revolutionary youth know that 75% of the MB will eventually take over Tahrir Square and will threaten anyone who planned to leave the site and label him a 'client'! ⁽³⁷⁾

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Western commentators have struggled to understand *feministrole* in the January 25th Revolution. With a jaw-wide open, women-leading the revolution in an Arab country wearing the veil certainly became no more than a stereotype of the weak, oppressed Muslim woman, ⁽³⁸⁾ who was then adopting a different disposition.

⁽³¹⁾Galal Amin, "*MazaHadath Lil Thawra Al Masreya*" (What happened to the Egyptian Revolution?)(Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk: 2012), p. 124. MB's stance may be due to the fact that Mubarak's regime intentionally succeeded in transforming all political parties into weak dwarfs who had no effect whatsoever.

⁽³²⁾Al-Menawy, "*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*," (The Last Days of Mubarak's regime: 18th Days) pp. 104-106. In fact, Security-Chief at the time Omar Suleiman confirmed the communication between the MB and elements from Hamas who entered the country and participated in the protests. It was only then that MB's demands changed to one demand; toppling the regime itself, while other religious demands disappeared based on MB's instructions "so as not to drive away moderate protesters who have no religious inclinations."

⁽³³⁾Ibid, pp. 375-376. That's why the MB was the first to manipulate martyrs' stories as told by their parents through repeatedly displaying them in its media under the banner 'the flowers that bloomed in gardens'.

⁽³⁴⁾Mohamed KadriSaeed, "*Adaa'a al Quwat al Musalaha*" (The Performance of the Armed Forces) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), p. 182. Indeed, MB seemed to occupy Tahrir Square on February 18, 2011 when Sheikh Youssef Qaradawy gave his speech surrounded by famous MB related figures guarded by the military while not permitting revolutionary youth to join.

⁽³⁵⁾Yousry El-Ezbawy, "*Mawkef al Ikhwan al Muslimeenwa al Quwa al Seyaseya al Mahguba an El Sharaiya*" (Muslim Brotherhood's Reaction) Dr. AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), p. 61.

⁽³⁶⁾SPIEGEL, "The Arab Revolution: A Nile Insurgency and Uncertain Egyptian Future." January 30, 2011.

⁽³⁷⁾Al-Menawy, "*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*," (The Last Days of Mubarak's regime: 18th Days) p.291.

⁽³⁸⁾Pete Ramand and Mahmoud Mahdy. "Feminism, Muslim Women and The Egyptian Revolution." *International Socialist Group Scotland*, March 26, 2012. www.internationalsocialist.org.uk.

Regarding *professional* and *labor syndicates*, the revolution succeeded in moving the still water which showed the ingrained crisis in the nature of their relationship with the State. The fact that the former government controlled these institutions and co-opted their leaders reflects why the revolution created a division in opinion between regime supporters and opponents. ⁽³⁹⁾ Essentially, an **image** of Egyptians remains to be divided; one pro-revolution campaign who believed that the revolution marks a new beginning, meanwhile an anti-revolution campaign who labels the revolution as a conspiracy to overthrow a good, progressive monarch. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

Meanwhile, religious institutions were represented in Egypt's Islamic Institution practicing moderate Islam *Al-Azhar* and Coptic *Churches* who had their own worries at the time of the revolution. Despite division within Al-Azhar between supporters and opponents, Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmed Al-Tayeb expressed his sorrow for the blood that has been spilled among youth who lost their lives during the demonstrations. In fact, Sheikh Al-Tayeb was the first to call them 'martyrs'. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Moreover, the three Coptic sects, Orthodox, Catholic and Anglican churches refused to participate in the January 25th Revolution and called its adherents to refrain from joining. However, some Copts defied the orders and joined the protests. ⁽⁴²⁾

Extensive research has been carried out on the Tunisian Revolution's *dominoeffect* on Egypt as the latter represented a time bomb that was ready to explode at any moment; herein, the Egyptian society that suffered for decades from poverty, unemployment, corruption, police brutality and human degradation. ⁽⁴³⁾ The percentage of poverty in Egypt ranges between 40% - 50% plus the spread of squatter settlements alone encompassing 12 million inhabitants. ⁽⁴⁴⁾ The turbulent situation was further instigated by the Tunisian Revolution. Hence, if Tunisia did it, Egyptians could do it too. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ Nevertheless, Middle East Correspondent of *The Independent* Robert Fisk argues that the Arab Spring did not begin in Tunisia; its beginning was in Mahalla Textile Company which went on strike in Egypt in 2006. Led by a woman, the

⁽³⁹⁾HowaidaAdly, "Mawkef al Nekabat al Mehaneyawa al Omalia" (Stance of Labor and Professional Syndicates) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), p. 158.

⁽⁴⁰⁾Sherine El Madany, "Unrest in Egypt: An Egyptian on the 1952 revolution," *LosAngelesTimes*, Opinion, February 11, 2011. From www.opinion.latime.com

⁽⁴¹⁾Hassan Mohamed, "Mawkef al Azharwa Dar al Iftaa'a" (Stance of al-Azhar and Religious Institutions) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp. 229-233. Al-Azhar was preoccupied by the suicide phenomenon that spread among Egyptians following Tunisian Bu-Azizi's suicide and the terrorist bombing of Al-Kediseen (Two Saints) church in Alexandria.

⁽⁴²⁾Hani Ayad, "Mawkef al Kana'es al MesriyawaRodoodAfa'alAlakbat" (Stance of Egyptian Churches and Copts' Reactions) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp. 217-226.

⁽⁴³⁾Khalil, "LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation", p. 310. Around 40% of the Egyptian population lived on less than \$2 a day.

⁽⁴⁴⁾Amin, "MazaHadath Lil Thawra Al Masreya", pp. 118-119.

⁽⁴⁵⁾Khalil, "LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation", p. 123. Former political Veteran AmreMoussa contends that the Tunisian Revolution provides a clear lesson: people will no longer accept to be marginalized.

protesters demanded better pay, working conditions and Mubarak's removal. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

The January 25th Revolution also spread to Asian countries like *Iran* which hoped to rid itself from the political pressures of 'Welayet El Faquih'. ⁽⁴⁷⁾ Iran eventually demanded from its government a *protestpermit* as a means of extending their support to the Egyptians; a call that was rejected at once. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

THE REGIME'S REACTION VIS-À-VIS DEMONSTRATORS

Mubarak regime miscalculated the January 25th Revolution as convulsions or some kind of *turbulences* resembling those of 1968 students' demonstrations and 1977 bread riots which will pass by and soon enough things will get back to normal. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Notwithstanding, the first figure to dismiss was Ahmed Ezz as Mubarak regime thought this step could appease demonstrators who considered Ezz the mastermind behind the corrupted NDP; a move that was welcomed in its own virtue; nonetheless, insufficient. For one thing, it was imperative to abandon the Minister of Interior Habib Al-Adly who won people's resentment.

In his 'emotional speech', Mubarak proceeded to offer new concessions by stating that he would not run for a new presidential period, calling on the Parliament and Shura Council to amend articles 76 and 77 in the constitution. Meanwhile, the Egyptian people wouldn't trust Mubarak's promises. When people did not buy that, Mubarak desperately started pointing fingers to special foreign agendas. ⁽⁵⁰⁾ Accordingly, much ink has been spent on a possible involvement of a *conspiracytheory* as state television fueled demonstrators' anxiety "with a steady diet of conspiracy theories claiming that shadowy foreign influences were behind the waves of civil unrest," ⁽⁵¹⁾ and indeed the **image** of a *Trinity of Fear Conspiracy Theory* lurked in which the Egyptian society had suffered subjugation under a despotic ruler who suppressed his people socially, economically and politically. ⁽⁵²⁾ After the January 25th Revolution, *The Daily Telegraph* claimed that

⁽⁴⁶⁾Reuel S. Amdur, "The Arab Spring Seen by Fisk." *The Canadian Charger* - Canada's National E-Weekly, March 25, 2013. www.thecanadiancharger.com/

⁽⁴⁷⁾AhmedFouadRaslan, "Misr al Thawra: al Tahadiwa al Istigaba" (*Egypt the Revolution: Challenges & Responses*), Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) (Cairo: Al Adab Publishing Press: 2011), p. 567. According to the Iranian constitution, truly the president holds the highest elected post; nevertheless, it is the 'Murshid' (Faquih/guide) who actually rules.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Salem, "AtharThawret 25 Yanayerala al Mantekah al Arabiya" (Repercussions of January 25th Revolution on the Arab Region) pp. 278-285. First, it was time to examine the false idea that a complete economic development may be achieved under autocratic and despotic regimes. Second, it certainly became impossible to use traditional methods when dealing with a revolution calling for change except by presenting a reform package and never resorting to coercive measures.

⁽⁴⁹⁾Atef Al-Ghamry, "Al ThawraWa al Mo'amara: 25 – YanayerBedayat al Tareekliltaghyeer, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), (Cairo: Dar NahdetMasrliilNashr: 2013), pp. 22-23.

⁽⁵⁰⁾ Abdel Fatah Maady, "Aada'a al Sulta al Tanfeezeya: TahlilMadmoonKhutabwaTasreehat Mubarak waSoliman" (How the Executive Branch Faired: Content Analysis of Statements issued by Mubarak and Soliman) Dr. AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*. (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp. 85-88.

⁽⁵¹⁾Khalil, "LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation," p. 237.

⁽⁵²⁾F. Raslan, "Misr al Thawra: al Tahadiwa al Istigaba" (*Egypt the Revolution: Challenges & Responses*) pp. 7-9. This relationship is further complemented by a foreign power that expresses its interests and ambitions in controlling the powerless country's future. Notably, the first foreign colonial power to have interests in Ancient Egypt was the Hyksos army which was defeated by Egyptian warrior Ahmos.

the U.S. appeared to have secretly supported the Egyptian uprising in terms of planning to change the regime three years earlier.⁽⁵³⁾ Though the then vice president Omar Suleiman concurred with Mubarak by referring to special agendas (local & foreign) involved in the debacle, Suleiman rejected immediate constitutional amendments to avoid what he termed as ‘constitutional vacuum’ and urged the holding of presidential elections in September 2011 as scheduled. Finally, he put conditions and restrictions on amending Article 76 and 88 in the constitution to guarantee especially tailored characteristics of the upcoming president.⁽⁵⁴⁾ For decades, Mubarak had associated with his elites and allies the term ‘*stability*’. However, neither Mubarak nor Suleiman comprehended the magnitude of the uprising nor did they understand that Egypt was witnessing a real populist revolution calling for democracy and that it was not possible to go back in time. Instead, the regime used tear gas, rubber-bullets and water cannons against the protestors besides terminating certain means of communication; mainly the cell-phone and internet, adding more fuel to the already burning situation.

Temporarily, a battle ensued in Tahrir Square that came to be called the ‘*Camel Battle*’ on February 2nd, 2011, the next day after Mubarak’s emotional speech.⁽⁵⁵⁾ This battle continued throughout the following day reflecting a struggle between pros and cons of Mubarak’s regime or rather between Egyptians versus Egyptians.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Yet, both Suleiman and Egypt’s then prime minister Ahmed Shafiq repeated the scenario of ‘Foreign Agenda’ or ‘Conspiracy Theory’. If both Suleiman and Shafiq stood for something, they certainly represented Mubarak’s shadow;⁽⁵⁷⁾ an **image** which prevailed for some time.

INTERNATIONAL DISPOSITIONS REGARDING THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

Image of the Egyptian peaceful protests was displayed by Western States which remarked that peaceful protests should continue. Yet, they expressed their concern for Egypt’s stability and that of the region. The EU called upon the Egyptian regime to urgently and peacefully respond to the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people for democratic and

⁽⁵³⁾Al-Menawy, “*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*,” (The Last Days of Mubarak’s regime: 18th Days) p. 84. The article further stated that the U.S. Embassy helped an Egyptian youth activist – pointing at WaelGhoneim – to attend a seminar under the auspices of the U.S. in New York. Upon his return to Egypt in 2008, this activist informed a number of American diplomats of a plan initiated by Egypt’s opposition to topple Mubarak’s government and put in force a democratically elected president in 2011.

⁽⁵⁴⁾Maady, “*Adaa’a al Sulta al Tanfeezeya: TahlilMadmoonKhubatwaTasreehat Mubarak waSoliman*” (How the Executive Branch Failed: Content Analysis of Statements issued by Mubarak and Soliman), pp. 89-90. Soliman’s reading of what was happening; nevertheless, seems far-fetched from reality by portraying demonstrations as a youth protest not people’s revolution while scaring the West of an Islamist ‘*bogeyman*’, insinuating the involvement of MB. Furthermore, Soliman accused national protesters of being employed by foreign agendas and used Mubarak’s military history as a pretext to continue his tenure.

⁽⁵⁵⁾Khalil, “*LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*,” p. 230. A battle occurred between the regime’s opposition and supporters and workers in petroleum companies owned by businessmen who financed them to buy their allegiance to the toppled regime by getting in an open exchange of phalanx of protesters centered in Tahrir Square. Significantly, some witnesses believe that the presence of the **MB** was felt on that particular day as it came up with a whole strategy by helping protesters organize the defense and devise spontaneous frontline strategies.

⁽⁵⁶⁾Al-Menawy, “*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*,” (The Last Days of Mubarak’s regime: 18th Days) p. 299. The phrase ‘The Camel Battle’ may be linked to Islamic battles. It stood for MB and Qatari Broadcast Network Al-Jazeera’s denial as both were the first to use the term referring to the camels mounted by Egyptians working on tourism at Nazlet Al Seman within the Pyramids’ vicinity. It represented the final lost opportunity for Mubarak to save the regime and the nation from getting involved in yet the worst to come.

⁽⁵⁷⁾Emad Gad, “*Al adaa’a al TafawoudiLinha’a al Azma*” (Negotiating toward Ending the Crisis) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), p. 113.

socioeconomic reforms. Both the U.K. and the U.S. issued statements calling for reform and an end to violence against 'peaceful protesters'. The U.S. and most *European countries* issued travel warnings and started to evacuate their citizens from Egypt. Post Mubarak's downfall, *Italy's* Prime Minister Berlusconi commented that there was nothing new; the Egyptians were making history as usual. Prime Minister Stolberg of *Norway* expressed that all the people are Egyptians and *Austrian* President Hans Fisher admired the Egyptian people for being the greatest people on earth who deserve to receive the Noble Prize. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ *British* Prime Minister David Cameron praised the revolution. (In fact, Cameron was the first world leader to visit Egypt on February 21, 2011 since Mubarak stepped down). Cameron remarked that the U.K. should teach the Egyptian Revolution in schools.

During the early days of the revolution, *U.S.* stance was characterized by perplexity and vagueness. It appeared watchful of the events trying to make some sense of how they developed. Some literature argued that Mubarak's ouster was not on U.S. political agenda at all, as all its research and intelligence agencies did not augur well for such major event. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ However, upon a statement made by Suleiman announcing that Mubarak had stepped down, two pertinent remarks characterized U.S. Stance. First, U.S. Defense Minister dispatched several communications to his counterpart, Egypt's Army General, during the revolution stressing non-involvement of Egypt's military in violent acts against protesters; hence, insinuating military's protection over the scene. Second, the U.S. disposition toward the Arab region has changed to supporting protesters quest for freedom; marking a break from its former stance in which it had previously supported authoritarian regimes to guarantee peace and security in the region – on pretext of preventing rise of Islamists to power – a policy that did not pay off and only begot hatred by many Arab States for the double role U.S. played in the region.

The looming question: Did U.S. disposition change regarding Mubarak's regime due to its perception that the regime was failing, and accordingly, it ought to reserve its place in the post Mubarak era or was it trying to fulfill a strategic plan – **the Great Middle East** – with Egypt being its core. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ Once Mubarak stepped down, the U.S. portrayed a feeble **image** of him. U.S. President Barak Obama hailed the achievement of the Egyptian people and regarded them as a role model to other activists claiming, "Let's look at Egypt's example." Consequently, the U.S. dispatched its Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to visit Egypt on March 15, 2011. ⁽⁶¹⁾ "We should teach the Egyptian Revolution to our children," a

⁽⁵⁸⁾F. Raslan, "*Misr al Thawra: al Tahadiwa al Istigaba*" (Egypt the Revolution: Challenges & Responses) pp. 22-23.

⁽⁵⁹⁾Al-Ghamry, "*Al Thawra Wa al Mo'amara: 25 – Yanayer Bedayat al Tareklitaghyeer*, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), p. 29. A lot of studies were undertaken by major U.S. institutions such as Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. that blamed CIA personnel for not being able to predict escalations of events. Fearful of losing its influence in the region, Expert Robert Danin, Council on Foreign Relations, cautioned that the U.S. "seems not to be driving the train as no [American] really knows where the train is heading." Indeed, the *New York Times* especially its intelligence agencies failed in estimating the real danger threatening Mubarak's regime after the downfall of Tunisian President Zein El Abideen Ben Ali as it determined the possibility and likeliness of toppling the regime in Egypt by only 20%. This erroneous estimation led the U.S. to hesitate between adopting cautious policy toward its historical and long-term ally or extend its support to the Egyptian people yearning for freedom and democracy.

⁽⁶⁰⁾Hani Raslan, "*Almauqef al Dawliwa al Arabi men al Thawra*" (International and Arabic Disposition Re the Revolution) AmrHashemRabie (ed.) in *January 25 Revolution: Initial Readings and Futuristic Vision*. (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies: 2011), pp. 259-265.

⁽⁶¹⁾Washington Agencies, "Follow Egypt's example, Obama tells Mideast." *Al Arabiya News*, February 15, 2011. www.alarabiya.net.

self-asserted Obama resonated. ⁽⁶²⁾ But, when Egypt's revolution had been completed, it would inspire the rest of the Arab world, thus, Egypt would play a strategic role in shifting the balance of power in the region in favor of the Arabs; a notion that the U.S. had to consider. ⁽⁶³⁾ Truly, the U.S. was in a stalemate, claimed former advisor to the U.S. administration Henry Kissinger, regarding whether it should extend its support to the revolution whose aim was spreading democracy and/or its fears from the consequences of the revolution vis-à-vis America's interests in the region. ⁽⁶⁴⁾

Israel expressed its anxiety about losing its long term peace partner and whether Egypt's new leadership would still uphold the Camp David Accords. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ A divided opinion prevailed in Israel between those who saw no change in their political relationship with Egypt and those who were unclear about how the situation would develop. Eventually, some Israelis warned of a new Turkey emerging while others feared a hegemon Islamic wave in the making with a new Iran on direct borders with Israel. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ "Toppling Mubarak meant discussing a rather different military budget." ⁽⁶⁷⁾ Moreover, with Sinai witnessing a number of explosions of gas pipes transmitting gas from Egypt to Israel, relationship between the two countries confirmed Israel's worries. ⁽⁶⁸⁾ Israel's President Shimon Peres appeared apprehensive of an extremist dictatorial regime reaching power in Egypt. Crucially, Director of The Washington Institute's Project on the Middle East Peace Process David Makovsky expressed his worries from revolutions in which Israel would find itself surrounded by Hezbollah from the North, Hamas from the West and MB from the South. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ Moreover, Shalom Cohen, Israeli diplomat who served as ambassador to Egypt from 2005 to 2010, postulated that Israel had two strict principles guiding its policy toward the new Egyptian regime: non-interference in the internal politics of its neighboring countries – by refraining from making any statements in the media that may be regarded as meddling in other countries' affairs and seizing every

⁽⁶²⁾F. Raslan, "*Misr al Thawra: al Tahadiwa al Istigaba*" (Egypt the Revolution: Challenges & Responses) pp. 22-23. CNN recounted that it was the first time the world witnessed people making a revolution and then cleaning up the mess from streets. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) expressed their wonder regarding the Egyptian demonstrators who set check points at the entrance to Tahrir Square to make a revolution.

⁽⁶³⁾Al-Ghamry, "*Al ThawraWa al Mo'amara: 25 – YanayerBedayat al Tareekliltaghyeer*, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), pp. 166-167.

⁽⁶⁴⁾ Ibid, pp. 174-175. In this vein, Kissinger postulates America's need for a different vision as far as its foreign policy is concerned to flee the deadlock. Noticeably, U.S. foreign policy has its own distinctive nature since its internal conditions represented in political parties and pressure groups greatly impact the country's foreign policy.

⁽⁶⁵⁾Khalil, "*LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*," pp. 310-311.

⁽⁶⁶⁾H. Raslan, "*Almauqef al Dawliwa al Arabi men al Thawra*" (International and Arabic Disposition Re the Revolution) pp. 265-267.

⁽⁶⁷⁾Al-Ghamry, "*Al ThawraWa al Mo'amara: 25 – YanayerBedayat al Tareekliltaghyeer*, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), p. 188. This statement was said by Israeli general Amos Yadlin at a conference in Hertzelia.

⁽⁶⁸⁾Al-Menawy, "*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*," (The Last Days of Mubarak's regime: 18th Days) p. 364. This was one of the peace agreement conditions Egypt signed with Israel in 1979. This file continued to enrage the Egyptian people due to the fact that Israel uses this gas (sold at very low cost) to kill Palestinians. Meanwhile, the former regime considered this file one of national security, and accordingly, it never discussed it with transparency.

⁽⁶⁹⁾Al-Ghamry, "*Al ThawraWa al Mo'amara: 25 – YanayerBedayat al Tareekliltaghyeer*, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), p. 189.

opportunity to emphasize the importance of maintaining the peace treaty with Egypt. ⁽⁷⁰⁾

Turkey had longed to revive its historical sovereign role over Europe, thus, it has resorted to watch the Egyptian Revolution in awe trying to play another role in the area after EU's repeated rejection of Turkey's membership. ⁽⁷¹⁾ **Iran** welcomed the revolution and tried to link it to Iran's 1979 Revolution. ⁽⁷²⁾ Indeed, Iran President Ahmadinejad told a crowd filling Tehran's Azadi Square, "Despite all the [West's] complicated and satanic designs ... a new Middle East is emerging without the Zionist regime and U.S. interference, a place where the arrogant powers will have no place." ⁽⁷³⁾

Studies on **Arabs** stance toward the January 25th 2011 Revolution reflected variation since Egyptian regime has been portrayed for its stability since 1952 Revolution and; hence, Egypt had promoted the pillars of peace and stability upon which other fragile Arab regimes rested. ⁽⁷⁴⁾

FIRST TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: ADVANCEMENT OR DEADLOCK

A lot of studies focused on the role played by SCAF during Egypt's transitional period toward democracy. Major literature examined the repercussions of the Egyptian Revolution and whether it succeeded in achieving its goals or ended in a stalemate. Soon after Mubarak resigned, SCAF realized that the best way for preserving its own power would be through a military-controlled transition. ⁽⁷⁵⁾ The army sought to ensure the loyalty of the country's largest and most organized political force, the MB, "in order to maintain the structure of the previous regime, only with a civilian face." ⁽⁷⁶⁾ SCAF's complete failure in running the country during the transitional period and choice of weak governments seemed to

⁽⁷⁰⁾ Steven Cook, Eric Trager, and Shalom Cohen, "Egypt on the Brink (Again)." *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, December 9, 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org/

⁽⁷¹⁾ F. Raslan, "Misr al Thawra: al Tahadiwa al Istigaba" (Egypt the Revolution: Challenges & Responses) p. 571.

⁽⁷²⁾ H. Raslan, "Almauqef al Dawliwa al Arabi men al Thawra" (International and Arabic Disposition Re the Revolution) pp. 267-268. This linking was emphasized by stressed Iran's Supreme Leader since 1989, Shia Marja' and Murshid Ali Khamenei who labeled Mubarak as a traitor and a client who defamed Islam. Khamenei called upon the Egyptian military to stand beside the Egyptian people and asked the people neither to trust the Americans nor the West who supported the former regime all along on the expense of creating true democracy.

⁽⁷³⁾ Molly Hennessy-Fiske, "Iran: Officials praise Egyptian uprising, stifle domestic protests," *Babylon & Beyond: OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQ, ITRAN, ISRAEL, THE ARAB WORLD AND BEYOND*. *Los Angeles Times World* from www.latimesblogs.latimes.com/

⁽⁷⁴⁾ H. Raslan, "Almauqef al Dawliwa al Arabi men al Thawra" (International and Arabic Disposition Re the Revolution) pp. 271-274. While **Syria** preferred to regard January 25th 2011 Revolution as an internal issue, **Saudi Arabia**, **Libya** and **Bahrain** extended their support to Mubarak. Saudi Arabia even alerted President Obama showing its preparedness to offer financial assistance to Egypt on an annual basis and replace USAID if the U.S. continued pressuring Mubarak to step down. Once the regime was toppled and the SCAF took over, Saudi Arabia renewed its readiness to offer financial assistance to SCAF. Meanwhile, **Tunisia**, **Qatar** and **Sudan** welcomed the transition to SCAF.

⁽⁷⁵⁾ Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF. Middle East Rep. No. 121. Washington, D.C.: International Crisis Group, 24 April 2012. From The George Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The Institute for Middle East Studies, IMES Capstone Paper Series. "The Egyptian Military in Post-Mubarak Politics: The Protector or Prosecutor of the Revolution," by Melissa Brashear, Sara Girgis, Matthew Kimmel, May 2012. www.gwu.edu/

⁽⁷⁶⁾ Farid Zahran, "Has the army truly withdrawn from Egyptian politics?" *Daily News Egypt*, March 19, 2013. Dailynewsegypt.com. Zahran posits that SCAF hastened to hand power in Egypt over to MB not due to fear of popular revolt or the army pursuing its interest but rather due to pressure from the U.S. and Europe.

be chosen on purpose and for vague reasons. Eventually, the military's conduct over the transitional period "it directly governed Egypt is a model for how not to conduct a transitional process." ⁽⁷⁷⁾ Despite earlier claims made by SCAF that it would —guard the revolution and the legitimate demands of the people – it has "resorted to unleashing its monopoly on the use of force to maintain its interests." ⁽⁷⁸⁾ It may be advisable to view SCAF's practices during the transitional period, through Marxist prism where people in authority possess the economic power and make use of especially the military to remain in power; thus, coercion becomes their weapon to silence opposition ... This is a living proof that SCAF under General Hussein Tantawi could not under any condition betray the previous regime which it bloomed and flourished under. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ Not only did SCAF function miserably during the transitional period, but it also enraged people.

Further research focused on *major events* that prevailed two years post the Egyptian Revolution and which managed to tarnish Egypt's **image** in general. "The level of security in general and the efficiency of the security have decreased... Car thefts, thugs' criminal actions, and the looting of antiquities have increased immensely." ⁽⁸⁰⁾ The dangers of the *thugs* phenomenon and their spread in Egypt may be traced to the past regime's security agency which has institutionalized its task in response to Mubarak's police state based on 'securing the regime' rather than the 'country's national security'; a principle that dictatorial regimes followed to ensure their continuity. ⁽⁸¹⁾ It was assumed that the military would transfer power because the Egyptian street and elected parliament have gained some traction. SCAF only transferred power on terms that it ultimately benefitted from and not necessarily due to Egyptians' desires for real democracy resulting in what may be considered a deal between SCAF and MB to rule Egypt. Accordingly, the military rationalized its working relationship with the MB out of necessity rather than good will. ⁽⁸²⁾

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN POWER

With MB's government elected President Mohamed Morsi, the issue of *thugs* reached unprecedented heights. ⁽⁸³⁾

⁽⁷⁷⁾ H.A. Hellyer, "Military intervention and Egypt's Future," *Daily News Egypt*, March 19, 2013. www.dailynewsegypt.com/

⁽⁷⁸⁾ Steven Cook, "Ruling but Not Governing," The Johns Hopkins University Press. (Baltimore, 2007). Pp. ix from The George Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The Institute for Middle East Studies, IMES Capstone Paper Series. "The Egyptian Military in Post –Mubarak Politics: The Protector or Prosecutor of the Revolution," by Melissa Brashear, Sara Girgis, Matthew Kimmel, May 2012. www.gwu.edu

⁽⁷⁹⁾ Amin, "MazaHadath Lil Thawra Al Masreya," pp. 318-320.

⁽⁸⁰⁾ Bakr, *The Egyptian Revolution*, (2012).

⁽⁸¹⁾ Al-Ghamry, "Al Thawra Wa al Mo'amara: 25 – YanayerBedayat al Tareekliltaghyeer, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), pp. 37-39. Thugs were present at poll stations and were ready to attack rivals of their candidates who financed them to do so. In fact, the Minister of Justice in EssamSharaf's Government determined that the number of thugs then was half a million; each receiving L.E.5000 per task. Meanwhile, another official in the Ministry of Interior ascertained that the number of registered dangerous persons exceeded one hundred thousand persons.

⁽⁸²⁾ Maj. Gen. HamdyBekheit, 16 March 2012, Dr. Ahmed Abdel Halim, 11 March 2012, & Mohamed Youssry 13 March 2012. Personal Interviews. From The George Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The Institute for Middle East Studies, IMES Capstone Paper Series. "The Egyptian Military in Post –Mubarak Politics: The Protector or Prosecutor of the Revolution," by Melissa Brashear, Sara Girgis, Matthew Kimmel, May 2012. www.gwu.edu

⁽⁸³⁾ Mohamed Elmasry, "Morsi: Defending the Indefensible." *The Canadian Charger* - Canada's National E-Weekly, March 10, 2013. www.thecanadiancharger.com. Ironically, Morsi had repeatedly been waving a threatening finger on air saying he would 'never be lenient' with thugs who have been trying to divert the Egyptian Revolution. Paradoxically, he declined calling his supporters 'thugs'

Several studies tackled the phenomenon of the kidnapping incident of the seven soldiers in Rafah on May 16, 2013, pointing to how Egypt portrayed an **image** of a 'soft state'. Defense Ministry officials explained that the captors demanded "the release of all suspects arrested on suspicion of attacks in Sinai, including an August 2012 *El-Arish police station attack* that killed 16 Egyptian officers" at sunset while they were breaking their fast during the Holy month of Ramadan. ⁽⁸⁴⁾ Such incident was the worst Egypt has witnessed since 1967 defeat as "it [embodied] roots of the fragmentation of the Egyptian state that [would] eventually drown Egypt in a violence dilemma where the final word [would] be that of armaments". ⁽⁸⁵⁾ Paradoxically, the time has come for Egypt to negotiate with terrorists. ⁽⁸⁶⁾

A number of articles tackled the rise of *Islamicdogma*, with MB ascending power, that put more weight on physical appearance and how this notion served MB's interests. Morsi was akin on taking over the minds of the Egyptian people by venturing all institutions and stationing MB representatives in ministerial positions. "After all, [MB] views itself not as a political party directed by a single chairman, but as a cohesive "society" that operates on the basis of internal consultation, or shura." ⁽⁸⁷⁾ Once in power, MB has displayed more interest in the nation's identity rather than politics. It had plunged the country toward tyranny as it attempted to Islamize the government and society for keeps; excluded all non-Brothers from the political process; attacked Christians; curtailed media freedoms and jailed journalists. ⁽⁸⁸⁾ "Morsi has compounded the problem by showing so little sensitivity to or support for Egyptians' equal rights." ⁽⁸⁹⁾ Notably, MB came to power without a social and economic program while preferring to talk or listen to no one and never expressed its interest in compromise. ⁽⁹⁰⁾ "Added to the tense political situation are rapidly shrinking foreign currency reserves, an economy that is dead in the water, and an unemployment rate that has risen to 13.5%, and close to 25% for Egyptians aged 15 to 29. The number of Egyptians living below the poverty line has increased from 20% in 2010 to 25% today. And tourism, which

despite their recurrent besiege of various institutions in Egypt such as the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) or Media Production City (MPC).

⁽⁸⁴⁾ Ashraf Sadek, "Sinai Captors demand release of Rafah attack suspects," *The Egyptian Gazette*. May 19, 2013. Front page.

⁽⁸⁵⁾ Ashraf Aboulhoul, "The End of the Egyptian State." *Al-Ahram*, May 18, 2013. The fact that the kidnappers can be identified does not make the matter easy; instead, it reflects that these abductors are bold enough to challenge the state's institutions starting from the presidency, military to police forces.

⁽⁸⁶⁾ Abdel Nasser Salama, "Terrorism Discourse..!" *Al-Ahram*, May 18, 2013. Salama laments that we've become enslaved by weapons entering the country through illegal means and that the sole responsible for the lives of our kidnapped soldiers is the military that should neither concede to terrorists' demands nor negotiate with them through other parties as had been done in the past.

⁽⁸⁷⁾ Eric Trager, Katie Kiraly, Cooper Klose, and Eliot Calhoun, "Who's Who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. September 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org/

⁽⁸⁸⁾ Ralph Peters, "This blood is on the hands of Muslim Brotherhood," *New York Post*, August 15, 2013. www.nypost.com

⁽⁸⁹⁾ David Pollock, "A Conversation on Egypt's Future."

⁽⁹⁰⁾ Galal Nassar, "Still Focused on Identity?" *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 27, 2013. MB's legacy seemed to have been reduced to what's 'Halal' and what's 'Haram'; the righteous and the forbidden. Nassar concludes that it is hard to compromise unless one is willing to admit that he/she doesn't have a monopoly on the truth, or that the truth is not a divine thing.

contributes 11% of the gross domestic product, has tanked.”⁽⁹¹⁾

MB conducts its business by first and foremost consolidating power at home -- which may take years -- then they eventually turn to shape Egypt’s foreign policy by scrapping the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Accordingly, MB is likely to continue ruling Egypt for some time due to the fact that it is uniquely organized while its non-Islamist and liberal parties are fragmented.⁽⁹²⁾ Perhaps, MB has understood too well the important role played by the media in directing and re-directing public opinion. This may be reason why MB sought to silence news coverage as “significant predictor of the shifts in public opinion, shifts toward greater or lesser favorability toward these issues.”⁽⁹³⁾ In any democratic country, journalists must express their opinions.

Debatable issues like the *constitution*, parliamentary votes and how Morsi’s reluctance to rescind the new constitution despite people’s pleas has divided Egypt as secular opposition feared that such constitution ushers in an Islamic interpretation of laws. Imperatively, Morsi’s constitutional declaration protected MB from pending political threats while it implicated Mubarak regime’s officials, “thus complicating the former ruling party’s ability to challenge the Brotherhood in the next parliamentary elections... The declaration also prevents the courts from dissolving Brotherhood-dominated constitution-writing body.”⁽⁹⁴⁾ This constitution granted Morsi unprecedented executive power and annulled all lawsuits against his announcements. To wit, such act insulated Morsi and his MB from all checks and balances on their authority.⁽⁹⁵⁾ The constitutional crisis offers three lessons about the nature of MB’s rule. First, the group has longed to control the country and drafting a constitution is their prize. Second, Morsi was putting forth MB’s agenda. Finally, Morsi was not a compromiser since he had been the group’s internal enforcer and Mubarak’s main contact with the MB – a role he was in charge of due to his “ability to toe the group’s line without conceding anything.”⁽⁹⁶⁾

Despite Egyptian *feminist* groups continued fighting for their rights, some ultraconservative religious groups were trying to shy away from addressing such rights. Truly, women are full partners in building a democratic Egypt by demanding equal opportunities and presentation in the parliament. Their social and economic rights should be on the

⁽⁹¹⁾Conn Hallinan, “DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE; Egypt: A Coup In The Wings?” *The Berkeley Daily Planet*, Friday, March 22, 2013. www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/

⁽⁹²⁾Eric Trager, "Think Again: The Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Policy. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, January 28, 2013, pp. 3-5, www.washingtoninstitute.org Trager insinuates that the U.S. ought to see the MB for what it truly is: “a deeply undemocratic movement above all else [only interested in] enhancing and perpetuating its own power.”

⁽⁹³⁾McCombs, Maxwell E, and Donald L. Shaw."The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas," *Journal of Communication*.Symposium.No. 2 (1993). www4.ncsu.edu/

⁽⁹⁴⁾Max Fisher, "Egypt's Crisis gets worse: Five takeaways from President Morsi's speech." *The Washington Post*.December6, 2012. www.washingtonpost.com.

⁽⁹⁵⁾Eric Trager, “Beyond Gaza: The Foreign-Policy Implications of Morsi’s Power Grab,” *The Atlantic. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, November 27, 2012: 1-2. www.washingtoninstitute.org

⁽⁹⁶⁾ Cook & al, "Egypt on the Brink (Again)." *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, December 9, 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org/

agenda when addressing Egypt's future. ⁽⁹⁷⁾ “[S]ince the revolution, the White House’s attitude has been ambiguous, but it has refrained from overt criticism, even over a new constitution which hardened Shari’a law, backtracked on human rights promises and made ‘insulting people’ a criminal offence.” ⁽⁹⁸⁾

Morsi vis-à-vis different *institutions* ranging from the military, judiciary, interior ministry, Al-Azhar, church and the Egyptian people was a topic of major concern. Pertinently, Morsi capitalized on the military’s vulnerability in the aftermath of the August 2012 attack against its forces by Sinai-based militants by dismissing several high level intelligence leaders and governors. Field Marshal Tantawi, fatigued by the burden of governance, has willingly succumbed to Morsi’s maneuvers. Eventually, Morsi appointed Abdel Fatah Sisi as the new chief of staff and Defense Minister to take over Tantawi’s post. Nevertheless, tension between the military and Morsi escalated. ⁽⁹⁹⁾ It was predicted that though Morsi government sent the powerful Egyptian army back to the barracks, the latter might not stay there long. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

How Morsi put himself beyond the judiciary and *beyond any checks and balances* became an issue of further investigation. The “Court has been facing a ‘systematic plot to destroy it.’” ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Eventually, “Morsi[held] *executive* and *legislative* powers after the previous Islamist-dominated parliament was dissolved by court order.” In time, he moved to place himself beyond the reach of the *judicial* branch as well. ⁽¹⁰²⁾ Ironically, MB Attorney General have caused an uproar by contending that ‘civilians’ were entitled to arrest ‘lawbreakers’; a call that could be a “cover for the Morsi government to set up militias dominated by the MB. ⁽¹⁰³⁾ The rift between judges and the presidency grew wider and reached unprecedented levels as MB accused the former of being corrupt. ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ As for the role of *Al-Azhar* under the new

⁽⁹⁷⁾FatemaKhafagy, (ECUNW) Danish Institute for Parties & Democracy, "Domestic Developments with Regional Implications: The Future of Democracy in Egypt: Political Parties & the Role of External Actors," May 26-27, 2011.

⁽⁹⁸⁾Ashraf Sadek, “Goodbye Consensus. Hello Violence,” *The Egyptian Gazette*. February 22, 2013.

⁽⁹⁹⁾"Haaretz uncovers reasons behind tension between Morsi and El Sissi," *Egypt News Net*, February 23, 2013, www.egyptindependent.com/Haaretzreports how tension between the military and Morsi started with the drafting of the constitution leading to a split in opinion especially with the National Salvation Front (NSF) and eventually, Defense Minister Sisi called all opposition parties for a meeting and an open dialogue; an initiative that prompted Morsi to ask Sisi to cancel such call. The tension further escalated when Sisi ordered his forces to destroy tunnels between Egypt and Gaza without going back to Morsi.

⁽¹⁰⁰⁾Hallinan, “DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE; Egypt: A Coup In The Wings?”

⁽¹⁰¹⁾Al Masry Al Youm, “Ousted SCC judge files suit against new Constitution,” *Al Masry Al Youm* English Edition. January 8, 2013. www.egyptindependent.com. Former Deputy President of the SCC Tahani Al-Gebali alleges that Morsi’s new constitution constituted a violation of all norms when it ordered the removal of the seven judges from the SCC which is supposed to be independent and irremovable. (Notably, Al-Gebali was one of such judges removed from her post.)

⁽¹⁰²⁾Ashraf Khalil, ‘After the Power Play in Egypt: Morsi and the Islamists Vs Everyone Else,’ November 24, 2012. *Time World*, www.world.time.com.

⁽¹⁰³⁾Hallinan, “DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE; Egypt: A Coup In The Wings?”

⁽¹⁰⁴⁾Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Judges Club calls for presidential apology,” *ahramonline*. April 24, 2013. English.ahram.org.eg. Indeed, Veteran Judge and Head of Judges Club Ahmed Al-Zend had demanded Morsi to apologize for “insults” directed at Egypt’s judiciary by Islamist figures that at instances put the SCC under siege preventing judges from entering the building. In fact, Al-Zend dared all critics to come up with evidence proving that judges were corrupt.

constitution, it was still obscure as to what extent its views were binding on the government. ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Egypt's **image** was portrayed as a country that had become used to daily protests by supporters and critics of Morsi exhibiting public shows of strength. Notwithstanding constant unrest, Morsi continued to flatly declare that he has no intentions in rescinding the constitutional decree. The pressure did mount outside Egypt too. U.S. Senator John McCain urged President Obama to use U.S. aid to Egypt "as a leverage point to pressure Morsi." ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Actually, using aid as leverage is not only good policy; it is good politics. ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Despite U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's warning that the time was not right to give money to Egypt's MB, fortunately, for Morsi; the U.S. administration was there to lend a helping hand. Thus, every weapon delivered to Egypt could only be used to consolidate MB's grip on power. Egypt had a chance for moderation, yet, if the U.S. kept arming and aiding its most dangerous enemy, the MB, modernization would be practically impossible. ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Notwithstanding, America must pay to pacify the MB. ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Some analysts were alarmed by Morsi's domestic extremism which would slowly extend to international relations. ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ It was time to express some concern by America's referring to ideal goals. "The U.S. message to Morsi should no longer be 'We're with you,' watch out for some details around the edges." Instead, Washington should express its deep concern about MB's violations of core political and legal principles. Hence, it can't be partner with Egypt if the regime kept undermining Egyptians' democratic aspirations. ⁽¹¹¹⁾

Many studies focused on the *hastydecisions* taken by Morsi's regime; one of which was his imposition of Emergency Law on Port Said, Suez and Ismailia towns ensuing massive protests from their part requesting fair and just retribution for football fans killed during the infamous Port Said massacre of February 2, 2012. Political Scientist at Cairo University Professor Hassan Nafaa criticized how Morsi protected his MB party and made it his top priority and at the same time managed to enrage his opposition. While trying to use the army in an open confrontation with rioters, General Sisi warned Morsi "not to try and 'brotherhoodise' the military and also hinted darkly that the continued unrest could bring

⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Ashraf Sadek, "Looming Al-Azhar-Gov't row," *The Egyptian Gazette*, April 13, 2013. Front page. This ambiguity would definitely lead to future political and legal conflict.

⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Ashraf Khalil, "Morsi's Moment." *Time World*, November 27, 2012. www.world.time.com/

⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Trager, Eric. "The Missing Obama-Romney Debate on Egypt." *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. October 23, 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org.

⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Jay Sekulow, "Secretary Kerry, now is not the time to give money to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," *FoxNews.com*, March 04, 2013, www.FoxNews.com.

⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Adam Kredo, "Egyptian cleric says American aid is a mandatory tax." *Washington Times*, March 28, 2013. www.washingtontimes.com. Kredo reveals comments made by Egyptian cleric Khaled Said, the official spokesman of the Salafi Front, stating boldly that the U.S. is obliged to pay millions in aid to Egypt as 'jizya tax' (poll tax) as reparations for destroying Egypt and the Islamic nation.

⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Trager, "Beyond Gaza: The Foreign-Policy Implications of Morsi's Power Grab," November 27, 2012, Trager assumes that the solution rests in the hands of the U.S. through pressing Morsi to reverse course by using its economic aid and influence within the IMF, from which Egypt was seeking US\$4.8 billion loan as leverage.

⁽¹¹¹⁾ Thomas Carothers and Nathan J. Brown. "Recalibrating U.S. Policy in Egypt," *Washington Post*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2, 2013. www.carnegieendowment.org/

about a possible ‘collapse of the state.’”⁽¹¹²⁾ On occasions, the military had warned that its patience with the MB was wearing thin and that it was “trained to fight wars and protect borders, not to police cities or operate government services.”⁽¹¹³⁾

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S FOREIGN POLICY: CHARTING A DIFFERENT COURSE

Extensive literature exposed MB’s foreign policy overtures by exposing certain controversial matters such as newly formed relationships between the MB and Qatar, Iran, China, Japan, Brazil and Russia. Morsi had been communicating with **Qatar** regarding the running of the Suez Canal in return for providing Egypt with financial assistance.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ The first direct flight connection between Egypt and **Iran** in more than 30 years took off from Cairo International Airport on March 29, 2013. The two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote tourism between the two countries.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Historically and being a U.S. ally, Egypt had distanced itself from Iran. But under MB regime, things had changed.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Egypt’s economic quagmire and Morsi’s desire to collect cash at any cost prompted Tehran to fish in the dirty water resulting in Negad victoriously entering Al-Azhar while declaring Egypt’s defeat in a cold war that prevailed between the two countries over the past decades.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

Ostensibly, Egypt’s outreach to **China** and Iran indicated that Egypt’s foreign policy orientation seemed to be charting a different route or rather shifting away from the West. In Western perspective, the timing of Morsi’s visit to Iran appeared to be deliberately provocative, given the rising tension over Iran’s nuclear program. Morsi’s outreach to China was even more problematic to the U.S. since it would strengthen China’s foothold on the Mediterranean and access to the Suez Canal (an area that the U.S. had traditionally been afforded). Also, China would have access to American technology in Egypt which the U.S. would not particularly cherish.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Notably, the government of **Japan** rarely directs an official invitation to ministers unless they are part of the government, which brings skepticism to inviting Saad Al-Kattatny, head of resolved parliament, a major member of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and MB’s deputy head and its ‘brain’ Al-Shater. What was even more startling was

⁽¹¹²⁾Hallinan, “DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE; Egypt: A Coup In The Wings?” Hallinan claims that Egypt seems like a chessboard with a lot of pieces lining up for an assault on the king.

⁽¹¹³⁾Eric Trager, “Tired of the Brotherhood, Egyptians Want the Military Back – But Only Temporarily,” *The Atlantic*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 10, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org

⁽¹¹⁴⁾Ahmed Al-Moslemany, “El Taba’aa Al-Oula.” *Dream 2 TV*, January 22, 2013. “I don’t understand why until now [no official] appeared to tell us what Qatar exactly does or wants from Egypt and its relationship with Suez Canal. We need to know,” inquires Ahmed Al-Moslemany.

⁽¹¹⁵⁾Ashraf Sadek, “After 30 year, EgyptAir jet lands in Tehran,” *The Egyptian Gazette*, April 01, 2013. Front page.

⁽¹¹⁶⁾David Schenker and Christina Lin, “Egypt’s Outreach to China and Iran Is Troubling for U.S. Policy,” *Los Angeles Times*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 24, 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org.

⁽¹¹⁷⁾Nourhan Al-Sheikh, “Hal TatahawalMisriladawlaMareka?” (Will Egypt Turn into a Rogue State?) *Al-Ahram*, April 11, 2013. Al-Sheikh inquires if this guile breeds a new dimension to the region encompassing Sudan, Iran and now Egypt joining them as yet another rogue state?

⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Schenker& Christina Lin, “Egypt’s Outreach to China and Iran Is Troubling for U.S. Policy,” August 24, 2012.

Japan's describing the invitation as one of empowering the Egyptian leadership while not actually giving the chance to the opposition to express their disposition. ⁽¹¹⁹⁾

Morsi's trip to **Brazil** was considered a departure from Mubarak's lack of interest in Brazil for both financial aid and direct investments. Morsi's high hopes engulfed his desire for Egypt to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economic group countries. His mere visit to Brazil represented a message to Washington that Cairo was keeping its options wide open and was no longer willing to yield to the traditional framework of its former foreign policy. ⁽¹²⁰⁾

To emphasize bilateral ties between Egypt and **Russia**, Morsi had asked the Russian President Vladimir Putin for a \$2 billion aid as well as wheat supplies which the latter turned down. Meanwhile, YrisUshakov, Putin's assistant said that the amount was not a small sum and that the Russian government needed to study the decision before commenting. ⁽¹²¹⁾

Seeking to bail out Egypt's struggling economy, Morsi paid a visit to **Germany**. Meanwhile, some analysts viewed such visit as an opportunity for Germany to force Morsi to recant his bigoted ideology and act like a responsible leader who comprehended the painful historical realities including the Holocaust. ⁽¹²²⁾

U.S. CONNECTION TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Much ink has been spent on hot issues like *U.S. role* and *connection* to the **MB**. Former Pentagon official David Schenker had drawn concrete steps that Washington could take "to shore up Egypt's next leaders, preserve the revolution's democratic direction, and prevent the sort of stagnation that could foster Islamist ascendance." There seemed to be possible U.S. involvement with MB's ascendance to power. Indeed, there were steps that MB took to eventually win America's acceptance. ⁽¹²³⁾ Essentially, "Islamist movements need to achieve greater clarity in order to gain credibility in the West." ⁽¹²⁴⁾ Whereas Washington's policy rests on playing on the loans card sought by MB as a form of pressure to deliver its interest in the region by sending a stern message to Morsi to straighten up his act. ⁽¹²⁵⁾ "The U.S. [had] a much more

⁽¹¹⁹⁾Kamal Gaballa, "We el Shater fi el Yaban," (And El Shater in Japan), *Al-Ahram*, March 2, 2013.

⁽¹²⁰⁾Ahram Online (Egito), "Egypt's Morsi looks to Brazil for Investment, inspiration." *Ahram Online*. May 8, 2013. www.zappadiplomacia.com.br/

⁽¹²¹⁾Nada Badawi, "Russia snubs Morsi's \$2bn loan request," *Daily News Egypt*, April 20, 2013. www.dailynewsegypt.com

⁽¹²²⁾Eric Trager, "Will Germany Confront Morsi's Holocaust Denial?" *The Atlantic*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 29, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org

⁽¹²³⁾Abdel HalimKandil, "*Al Ayam al Akheera*" (The Final Days). Pp. 77-78. In its September 2007, *Foreign Policy's* columnist Mark Lynch and professor of Political Science in George Washington University, advised the then MB's Murshid Mahdi Akef of the best way to hold dialogue with Washington: being *clear* and *precise*, communicating in *Arabic* (MB needs to declare their stance to the Egyptian people). Regarding the content, *Israel's security* is a priority to America's interests followed by MB's strict statements *renouncing* violent *extremist movements* like Al-Qaada.

⁽¹²⁴⁾AmrHamzawy, Marina Ottaway, and Nathan J. Brown, What Islamists Need to Be Clear About: The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, "Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace." February 20, 2007. <http://carnegie-mec.org>.

⁽¹²⁵⁾Eric Trager, "Egypt will Be Unstable until Morsi Delivers on Domestic Promises," *Policy Alert*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 29, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org/

important role to play than the aid game. It [was] time to hold every one responsible for their actions.”⁽¹²⁶⁾

This was the first time Egypt went through an important experience in testing MB and the *Islamicwave’sabilitytorule*. There was no disparity between Mubarak’s regime and the MB regarding foreign or regional affairs. The fact that the MB was able to ascend power, gives no dimensions to the rest of the Islamic waves under the umbrella of MB.⁽¹²⁷⁾

ETHIOPIA’S GREAT RENAISSANCE DAM CRISIS & MB’S POWER PLUNGE

In his infamous broadcast meeting with certain opposition figures, Morsi displayed a tarnished **image** of a different Egypt as he discussed how the construction of Ethiopia’s Great Renaissance Dam constituted a major catastrophe to Egypt. Though the meeting was supposed to discuss the findings of the report conducted by the three countries concerned (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia), the meeting turned into a calamity.⁽¹²⁸⁾ “The meeting should have contributed in solving the crisis; however, it turned to be a crisis in its own virtue.”⁽¹²⁹⁾ Egypt has, unfortunately, become a country with no foreign policy -- Morsi’s 100 days turned to unfulfilled promises of building a civilian, national, constitutional and modern Egypt.⁽¹³⁰⁾

Ever since the MB “climbed to the top of Egypt’s political heap, it [has been] doing everything it could] to stay there. [MB emphasized] that their string of electoral victories since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster two years ago had given them ‘legitimacy’ – a word that [MB] reflexively invoke to defend everything.” MB realized the dire need to appoint former parliamentarian Mohamed Al-Beltagi to be in charge of restructuring and reforming the state apparatuses that were connected with the old regime; namely, the police, media and judiciary. In its bid to achieve control, MB relied on two strategies: Bypass the bureaucracy by delivering its own services to distribute below-market food commodities as a mechanism for winning popular support in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Second, MB attempted to continue its bid to accumulate power through the Parliament to bolster its ‘legitimacy’. Eventually, MB’s single-minded pursuit of power has instigated popular resistance and resentment to its rule; hence, contributed to Egypt’s instability. “As resistance to the Brotherhood’s domineering style escalates, nobody should mistake this power for control.”⁽¹³¹⁾

⁽¹²⁶⁾Octavia Nasr, “Is Egypt defying conventional political science?” Alarabiya.net English/Front Page. July 16, 2013. www.English.alarabiya.net/

⁽¹²⁷⁾HalaMostafa, "Al Waraka al Iraneya" (The Iranian Paper), America, Muslim Brotherhood and the Salvation Front, *Al-Ahram*, February 3, 2013: 10, www.alraay@ahram.org.eg/

⁽¹²⁸⁾Nada Hussein Rashwan, Ahram Online, "Egypt presidency, opposition figures discuss Ethiopia dam 'crisis'." June 3, 2013. <http://english.ahram.org.eg>. Members heralded confidential information that constituted a threat not only to the Ethiopian regime but also to Egypt’s government’s disposition and **image**. Information transmitted focused on the possibility of siding with Ethiopian rebels against their regime, spreading rumors of harboring latest warplanes or destroying the dam all together.

⁽¹²⁹⁾Salah Montasser, ‘A Trap in the Presidential Office,’ under “A Mere Viewpoint Column," *Al-Ahram*, June 6, 2013: Last page.

⁽¹³⁰⁾Ahmed Al-Moslemany, “El Taba’aa Al-Oula.” *Dream 2 TV*, June 05, 2013.

⁽¹³¹⁾Eric Trager, “In Power, But Not in Control,” *Foreign Policy*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 21, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org/

Paradoxically, the final straw that broke the camel's back had been Morsi's stumbling move when he appointed Adel Mohamed Al-Khayat as Luxor governor who was an accomplice in the 1997's Luxor massacre that took the lives of 58 tourists. ⁽¹³²⁾ Seemingly, the MB had always sided with corrupted forces against forces calling for democracy. Egypt's transition to democracy had not been a smooth one. Indeed, plans for such transition became a point of contention. ⁽¹³³⁾ "The [MB] appears unlikely to abandon exclusivist rule." ⁽¹³⁴⁾ Meanwhile, the MB ought to understand that "elections do not, by themselves, yield a democracy. Democratic values of inclusion are also vital." ⁽¹³⁵⁾ While the Europeans and the Americans hope the debacle Egypt was going through ended in a decent way, they claimed that the influence they have was a limited one; mainly economically as they have trade and tourism issues that Egypt was extremely interested in and bitterly needed. ⁽¹³⁶⁾ Whether democracy was compatible with Islamic Rule was also a point of contention, ⁽¹³⁷⁾ despite the statement, 'Egyptian people were not ready for democracy'. ⁽¹³⁸⁾

A number of conferences were held in Israel in which all speakers concurred that establishing democracy in Egypt was something that Israel did not desire and that a dictatorial regime in Egypt was in Israel's best interest. ⁽¹³⁹⁾ So whether Egypt was en route to democracy or not and despite Morsi's numerous mistakes, what really mattered was that his government did not pose any troubles to Israel and that was the best he could present to the Americans. Truly, Egypt was approaching a famine in about two to three months, Morsi; nevertheless, did nothing to face economic turmoil or contain

⁽¹³²⁾YasmineSaleh, "Mursi's controversial Islamist Luxor governor to quit: party," *Reuters*, June 22, 2013. www.reuters.com Significantly, Al-Khayat's appointment received popular dismay.

⁽¹³³⁾Khalil, "*LIBERATION SQUARE: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*", pp. 267-268. A package of constitutional amendments was put forth by Islamists who organized campaigns in favor of presidential elections before drafting a new constitution. However, most secular activists expressed their dismay toward such plan.

⁽¹³⁴⁾Eric Trager, "Egypt's Summer of Discontent," *Policy Watch 2079*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 28, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org/

⁽¹³⁵⁾Trager, "Think Again: The Muslim Brotherhood," January 28, 2013, Trager stresses that with Morsi's power grab through deploying violence against protesters, prosecuting his critics and extracting the country's resources for MB's own political gain, clearly manifests this regime's lack of these values. He concludes that the MB is a political organization that seeks power by using religion as a mobilizing tool.

⁽¹³⁶⁾Jan Techau, "*You Can't Turn Egypt into a Democracy Overnight*," January 28, 2013. Political Analyst Techau expressed that the EU was deeply concerned that MB President Morsi could crack down on the opposition even more and that the entire transition process got out of hand or went in a wrong direction.

⁽¹³⁷⁾Alaa Al-Aswany, "*Hal Nastaheq Al Demokratia?*" (*Do We Deserve Democracy?*), (Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk: 2010), pp. 134-136. According to Islam, if the ruler is unjust, people have the right to remove him; an action which is congruent with democracy. Second, true understanding of Islam frees man from fear and humiliation; all of which have been misunderstood to mean complete submission to fatalism. Third, Islam calls upon people to work and take cause and effect seriously.

⁽¹³⁸⁾Al-Menawy, "*Al-Ayam Al-Akheera Li-Nizam Mubarak: 18 Yom*," (The Last Days of Mubarak's regime: 18th Days) p. 405. Notably, Chief International Correspondent for CNN Christiane Amanpour reported that it was vice president Omar Suleiman who made that remark that received people's fury.

⁽¹³⁹⁾Al-Ghamry, "*Al ThawraWa al Mo'amara: 25 – YanayerBedayat al Tareeklitaghyeer*, (The Revolution and the Conspiracy: 25 January – the beginning of the Road to Change), p.187.

political turbulences. ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Despite the fact that ending an authoritarian regime was certainly a positive development, it remained to be seen whether “the assessment could change should secular dictators be replaced with theocratic dictators.” ⁽¹⁴¹⁾

“The Arab Spring has arrived late and as a surprise no doubt and it is still an embryo trying to survive.” ⁽¹⁴²⁾ Truly, Arab youth Tsunami killed the concept of fear. Nevertheless, the second Arab Spring battle became a clash between Fear Mogul and Sarcasm. ⁽¹⁴³⁾ “According to the Egypt-based Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, four times as many lawsuits for ‘insulting the president’ were filed during Morsi’s first 100 days in office than during Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-year reign.” ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Yet, “[s]ilencing a comedian doesn’t qualify you to be the president of Egypt.” ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

Special attention was paid to means by which the U.S. should handle an *Islamist* rise in Egypt. Some American experts claimed that Egypt was undergoing a new revolution and that the U.S. should not bet on the MB because it was not going to stay forever. Meanwhile, others stressed that once the MB gained control, it would be “almost impossible for the people to take it back.” ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Essentially, “Washington’s message to Cairo’s emerging leaders should be that U.S. support – both direct and indirect – is conditional on their cooperation in maintaining peace with Israel and preserving political pluralism and religious and minority rights.” ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Some analysts claimed that cooperation with Washington couldn’t be reconciled in the long run with the MB who possessed anti-Western ideology and that it would definitely be credulous to believe that Morsi would not turn on Washington when he felt that the time was right. ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

⁽¹⁴⁰⁾David Ignatius, "In Egypt, sliding toward ruin," *The Washington Post* Opinions, March 6, 2013. www.articles.washingtonpost.com/

⁽¹⁴¹⁾David Schenker, "Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?" *World Affairs Journal*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jan/Feb 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org.

⁽¹⁴²⁾Nasr, "Is Egypt defying conventional political science?" *Alarabiya.net English/Front Page*, July 16, 2013. www.English.alarabiya.net/

⁽¹⁴³⁾Samir Al-Eita, "AlSokhryaMamnou'aa" (Sarcasm is Forbidden). *Le Monde diplomatique, Al-Ahram*. April 20, 2013: 5. <http://www.mondiploar.com/> Eita refers to heart surgeon and satirist Bassem Youssef and cautions that the irony rests in how the regime attempted to consolidate and secure its power by forbidding sarcasm through the frequent warrants directed to Youssef.

⁽¹⁴⁴⁾Eric Trager, "Egypt Takes Another Step Toward Autocracy -- and Instability." *Policy Alert*, The Washington Institute, April 1, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org. The warrant directed to Comedian Bassem Youssef comes amidst what the opposition says is a widening government crackdown against its ranks, fueling concerns about freedom of expression and assembly under MB’s rule.

⁽¹⁴⁵⁾"The Daily Show," *Facebook*, John Stewart, Web, facebook.

⁽¹⁴⁶⁾Glenn Kessler, "Three possible scenarios for Egypt's future," *Washingtonpost.com*. February 4, 2011. www.washingtonpost.com. He referred to the core problem: Egyptians may not really know what they want, the fact remains that they certainly know what they don’t want; i.e. another despotic regime.

⁽¹⁴⁷⁾Robert Satloff and Eric Trager, "How the U.S. Should Handle the Islamist Rise in Egypt." *Wall Street Journal*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 23, 2012. www.washingtoninstitute.org.

⁽¹⁴⁸⁾Eric Trager, "Back to Mubarak," *New Republic*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 25, 2013. www.washingtoninstitute.org. Trager reiterates the proclamation made by MB’s Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie who “drew an analogy between Prophet Muhammad’s victory over his seventh century adversaries and the ultimate triumph of the Brotherhood’s ‘Renaissance Project’ over ‘materialistic’ Western civilization, which ‘made blood and lives the cheapest things in the world.’” Moreover, Trager

As violence escalated in Egypt between Morsi's supporters, on the one hand, and moderate Muslims and secular and leftist Egyptians along with Christians and women, on the other, Morsi continued to issue stern and vague warnings claiming that he would cut off any finger that meddles in Egypt. "I could see two or three fingers that are meddling inside," declared Morsi without elaborating. ⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

'TAMAROD' (REBEL) CAMPAIGN & RISE OF A CHARISMATIC PERSONA

Having been ruled by a megalomaniac who's backed by a well-organized militia willing to do whatever it takes to consolidate MB's power, political youth have launched 'Tamarod' (rebel) petition campaign "to 'withdraw confidence' in Morsi and rally public support for early presidential elections focusing on specific grievances, including the persistent lack of security, ongoing poverty, and Morsi's supposed subservience to the Americans." ⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Consequently, many campaign organizers have received death threats! ⁽¹⁵¹⁾ "The youth will take to the streets [on June 30] to clarify that the road to their future is in their own hands ... Importantly, the MB should be aware that the [Egyptian] youth is angry," said Mohamed HassaneinHeikal to anchorwoman Lamees Al-Hadeedy on CBC channel. ⁽¹⁵²⁾ The failure and fragmentation of political groups in presenting themselves as an alternative political power has paved the way to the success of Tamarod as a movement. ⁽¹⁵³⁾ Notably, Tamarod was so obviously, so overwhelmingly the most incredibly successful opposition game in town that all opposition parties have rallied to.

In response, Morsi took a defiant and reluctant stance and instead of conceding to the will of the Egyptian people, he resonated that '*legitimacy*' brought him to office and, thus, it was him or bloodshed! Meanwhile, MB supporters had gathered in two major destinations, RabaaAdawiya Square in Nasr City and Nahda Square adjacent to Cairo University in Giza area, against Tamarod's people or what have become the Egyptian people. Perhaps the original sin of the MB government was "to promise a broad coalition government representing all of Egypt's political forces and religious communities during Morsi's campaign for the presidency, and then not to do it." ⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ Significantly, "Morsi has managed

points to how Morsi solicited every possible opportunity to project his intention to rule exclusively if elected by siding with liberals and non MB's during his presidential campaign. However, once he became president, Morsi sidelined these supporters and drove them into the opposition.

⁽¹⁴⁹⁾HamzaHendawi, "Morsi Issues Vague Warning After Violence Rocks Cairo," *Huff Post*, Huffington Post. March 24, 2013. www.huffingtonpost.com

⁽¹⁵⁰⁾Trager, "Think Again: The Muslim Brotherhood," January 28, 2013

⁽¹⁵¹⁾HendKortam, "Political youth receive death threats," *Daily News Egypt*, May 26, 2013. <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/>

⁽¹⁵²⁾Mohamed HassaneinHeikal, (Leading Egyptian journalist and a respected commentator on Arab affairs), interview by Lamees Al-Hadeedy, CBC Channel "MisrIlaAyen Program," Podcast Video, June 27, 2013. According to some foreign agencies and Google earth's estimates and in an unprecedented scene for Egypt and the world, approximately thirty-three million people took to the streets on June 30, 2013 protesting against Morsi's regime advocating 'Tamarod'. They marched to Tahrir Square, Itehadeya along with major governorates all over Egypt calling for an end to MB Regime.

⁽¹⁵³⁾AnwaarAbdalla, "Tamarod (Rebel): The new face of opposition in Egypt," *The Washington Times Communities*, June 30, 2013. www.communities.washingtontimes.com/

⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ AbdallahSchleifer, "Egypt's June 30 rallies: Between the irresponsible and the obtuse," *Al Arabiya*, June 30, 2013. www.english.alarabiya.net/

to anger every tier of Egypt's class-ridden society [and] eyes have naturally turned to Egypt's armed forces." ⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ As matters escalated, Defense Minister General Sisi had borne upon the military's burden to protect Egypt internally and externally. Sisi "gave Morsi 48 hours to stop all the bickering and return to sanity," act as president for all Egyptians and call for an early elections; a demand that was met by Morsi's arrogant refusal and instead resorted to calling himself a martyr for legitimacy, which the Egyptian people gave him. ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Consequently, Sisi aligned himself with the masses against a leader who lost his legitimacy. Sisi defied the U.S. as he was fully aware of the U.S.-Brotherhood deal and, accordingly, declared his country's independence. ⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

SECOND TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: PROGRESS OR STALEMATE

- *A Coup or Not a Coup*

Studies focused on how General Sisi crafted his statements by calling upon Morsi to re-consider people's demands for early elections and dismiss HeshamKandil's government. ⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Meanwhile, the U.S. and the West attempted to deny the voice of the Egyptian people in delegating its army to rid the country of MB rule and to crack down on all their acts of terror carried out by them or their clients. Accordingly, the West chose to label people's protest as a *military coup*. ⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ Furthermore, Senator John McCain's call to MB leadership "validates the widespread belief in Egypt that America is a fellow conspirator with the Brotherhood." ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

Much ink has been spent on how the Western governments and the U.S. regarded the interim government under the leadership of Chief Justice of the SCC of Egypt Adly Mansour. U.K.'s Cameron appealed to all sides to stay calm and stop the violence and that the U.K. should support a proper democratic government by consent and not support any single

⁽¹⁵⁵⁾From the print edition: Middle East and Africa. "Crisis in Egypt: More Worrying than ever," *The Economist*, June 29, 2013, www.economist.com

⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ MostafaShehata, "How did the Muslim Brotherhood's regime fall?" *Al-Tahrir*, July 17, 2013, pp.2-3. Sisi's professionalism and precision crystallized the demonstrators' demands in his succinct statement as follows: "It is imperative that the people get a response to their movement from every party that bears a measure of responsibility during this dangerous period for the homeland," and "the armed forces will not be a part of the political arena or the rule and shall not transgress out of its role decreed within democratic vision mandated the will of the people."

⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ Ibrahim Essa, "Sisi of Egypt!" *Al-Tahrir*, July 17, 2013, p.8. Sisi stood up firmly to the MB and its militant terrorists with a long bloody history. Sisi represented an altruistic man determined to preserve his military while respecting the revolutionary will of the Egyptian people.

⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Euronews, "Egypt armed forces chief Abdul Fattah Sisi – a man of destiny," *Euronews*, August 19, 2013. www.euronews.com. Indeed, in a clear posture, Sisi had repeatedly resonated, "The will of the Egyptian people is free, their will is free, they can choose whoever they want to rule them, and we are the guardians of this will. I want to tell you that the honor of protecting the will of the people is more valuable to us and to me personally than the honor of ruling Egypt. I swear to God on this."

⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ Makram Mohamed Ahmed, "Tahzeer Saudi lil-Mugtamaa el Dawli," (Saudi Warns the International Community) *Al-Ahram*, August 22, 2013. Indeed, the Western World threatened to sever their financial assistance to Egypt if the latter does not put an end to persecuting MB and trying their leaders for crimes that reach treason.

⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ WorldTribune.com, "Alliance with Cairo at risk: McCain and Obama are 'trying to destroy Egypt'," *World Tribune*. August 15, 2013. www.worldtribune.com This comment was made by U.S. analyst Raymond Ibrahim, an associate fellow at the Middle East Forum asserting that "Egyptians believe the U.S. fears that Morsi and others, if tried, would reveal the nature of their cozy relationship with the U.S. government, leading to any number of ugly revelations – treasonous ties and conspiracies, the exchange of billions of dollars, and Sinai issues."

group or party. The EU called upon all parties to exercise maximum restraint.

Meanwhile, the MB at both sit-ins in RabaaAdawiya and Al-Nahda Squares welcomed martyrdom. They couldn't possibly say that and then cry in horror expressing that the police forces were killing them. Following the clearance of protesters by security forces, the West expressed their grief and dismay by the number of deaths and victims that fell. Whereas, supporters of the status quo internally and internationally preferred to identify Egypt as a country in chaos or on the brink of civil war, ⁽¹⁶¹⁾ others regarded the procedures for such clearance was well-balanced, carefully studied and carried out with extreme caution. ⁽¹⁶²⁾

The naked acts of sectarian hatred could have been enough to put an end to global statements from referring to the so called 'peaceful' nature of pro-Morsi protestors. ⁽¹⁶³⁾ EU held their meetings to discuss the situation in Egypt mentioning their financial and military assistance to Egypt and whether they should play that card. Some experts cautioned that imposing economic sanctions on Egypt might do more harm than good to their interests in Egypt. Consequently, the MB "has made use of the international organization's significant resources in media and political terms [through] warning that failure to respond to the group's demands in Egypt will trigger terrorist threats targeting mainly European countries. In response, Europe has increasingly adopted a tough stance against Egypt's interim rulers." ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

- ***A Ray of Hope***

With acts of violence and terror escalating in Egypt, Saudi Arabian King Abdullah Bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud sent a tolerant and ambivalent message not only to Egypt, but also to the whole world in which he expressed his country's full support to Egypt in its war on terrorism and in its fight against all belligerent efforts aiming at its national security. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), States of Kuwait and Bahrain as well as Iraq and Kingdom of Jordan followed suit by supporting Egypt both financially and mentally. ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

- ***Unraveling the Real Conspiracy & Declaring MB a Terrorist Group***

Finally, the Egyptians have got to know the real invisible destructive hands that burned and destroyed Egypt; the

⁽¹⁶¹⁾Dr. Ossama al-GhazaliHarb, *CBC + 2 Channel*, August 2013. Al-GhazaliHarb, founder and former president of the Democratic Front Party, advocated that the protests were cleared in a 'civilized' manner.

⁽¹⁶²⁾HamdyBekheit, *Al-Nahar Channel*, August 14, 2013.

⁽¹⁶³⁾AbdallahSchleifer, "Misinformation about Egypt's 'massacre'," *Al Arabiya*, August 15, 2013. www.english.alarabiya.net/Schleifer asserts, "non-violence does not mean building barricades to hold off the Egyptian riot police and breaking up pavement stones to throw at them." He adds that MB protestors were confronted not by police but the Egyptians living in the neighborhoods were such protestors sat-in. This element that seems to be missing from so much of the discourse is that it was not a conflict between the MB with the military or security forces, but rather it was a conflict between the MB with most Egyptians, who were supported by the army and who wanted an end to this sit- ins and life, tourism and jobs to return to normal.

⁽¹⁶⁴⁾Abdullah Kamal, "Egypt's political roadmap is at stake," *Al Arabiya*, August 17, 2013. www.english.alarabiya.net.

⁽¹⁶⁵⁾MamdouhShaaban, "Rouh October Ta'aoudlil-Arab Ba'ad 40 Aman," (October Spirit Returns to the Arab after 40 Years) *Al-Ahram*, August 22, 2013. In fact, Saudi King emphasized that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is prepared to compensate Egypt with financial assistance which the U.S. and Western countries threaten to cut off. This message constitutes a strong blow to the Western world and represents a reminder of October '73 Arab coordinated spirit initiated by KSA when it halted oil export to all countries supporting Israel.

MB. Truly, police security managed to uncover MB's true face. ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Nevertheless, what was important was the political implication because what happens in Egypt, not only affects the social fabric or the society, but also the whole Arab world and that division in government regarding protests, "MB hardliners are going to resist no matter the cost. What we're seeing is the question of transition and real democracy in Egypt." Significantly, Egypt is certainly not at war with the MB, rather it is at a historical confrontational war with the West that aims at transferring it into another Iraq or Syria with the help of MB. ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

Particular studies focused on General Sisi's demand from the Egyptian people to support the Egyptian military in waging war on terrorism by asking people to take to the streets on July 26, 2013. ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ Moreover, the clampdown by the military on MB supporters had met West's discern and condemnation; an issue that tarnished Egyptian military-led government's **image**.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR EGYPT

Questions loomed post the Egyptian Revolution as to what may become of Egypt? What are prospects of **future scenarios** for Egypt? ⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ At earnest, veteran diplomat correspondent and columnist for *The Washington Post* Glenn Kessler assumed three possible scenarios for Egypt's future. First, an Iranian outcome which resembled Iran's present regime; second an Indonesian outcome which gave way for moderate political forces to emerge, with the military assisting to provide stability during the transitional period; third a Romanian outcome through which the country's power elite and remnants of the old regime "slowly [squeezed] the life out of the opposition by making Mubarak a transitional figurehead and enacting a few cosmetic reforms that [gave] the illusion of change" to ensure an elected president holding onto the same power structure. ⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

PORTRAYING EGYPT'S IMAGE BY THE WEST

Further literature on the **image** of the Egyptian Revolution adopted an empirical approach by focusing on observing and describing forces that interplayed during and post the Revolution. One research was titled "*The Image of Muslim Communities in European Press: an Analysis of a Sample of German and British Newspapers & Magazines*," an

⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Farouk Gouaida, "Haqiqet el Lahw el Khafi," (The Invisible Destructive Hands), *Al-Ahram*, August 20, 2013.

⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ Sameh Abdallah, "Akhtar Shahr fi Tareekh Misr," (The Most Dangerous Month in Egypt's History) *Al-Ahram*, August 22, 2013.

⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ Gaber Asfour, "26 Youlyou ... waDelalato," (July 26 ... And its Connotations), *Al-Ahram*, July 31, 2013. Asfour compared the same date to that of July 26, 1952 when he personally witnessed the departure of King Farouk from Egypt. Asfour claimed how Sisi has much in common with Egypt's President Abdel Nasser and assumed Sisi to nestle in people's hearts as a beloved leader.

⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ Bakr, *The Egyptian Revolution* (2012) Whereas the West posited three possible scenarios: a Burmese military, a Turkish or an Iranian model, Dr. Bakr projects a pendulum principle that swings to the far opposite; from extreme optimism to extreme pessimism. The first scenario is the birth and revival of the liberal trend which is youthful and willing to create a coalition with Islamic trend and capable of reviving the Egyptian economy. The second scenario is the consolidation of the Islamic trend under the banner of MB and its Freedom and Justice party (FJP). (Little did Dr. Bakr know at the time of writing her paper that the second scenario would take over the government in Egypt for some time?) As for the third scenario, Dr. Bakr presumed that it was difficult to predict the model Egypt would follow, be it the Iranian, or the Turkish or the Pakistani model. However, she cautioned that the worst case scenario might be Egypt's fragmentation.

⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ Glenn Kessler, "Three possible scenarios for Egypt's future," *Washingtonpost.com*. February 4, 2011. www.washingtonpost.com.

M.S. Thesis carried out by Sara Said El Maghraby. Sara's findings revealed that both German and British presses emphasized the negative characteristics of their Muslim communities as resorting to violence, unable to assimilate in European society, with low level of education and culture. ⁽¹⁷¹⁾

CONCLUSIONS

Formulating an **image** of "the other" remains an issue of major concern. Most of the above literature focused on how Egypt had dealt with the Egyptian Revolution and the forces that interplayed in weaving the outcome of the debacle. Meanwhile, the U.K. and the U.S. watched the events with anticipation. Quite a few studies tackled how Western presses in these two countries portrayed major events that Egypt witnessed and their implications on Egypt's relation with the Western and Arab world. Accordingly, the researcher plans to solicit two stages for the Egyptian Revolution: January 25th through February 11, 2011 and June 30 through July 3, 2013 as a demarcation line or a turning point in Egypt's history reflecting the downfall of two consecutive regimes. She will spot events that took place in changing Egypt's course. The researcher will examine how each of the U.K.'s and U.S.'s chosen newspapers particularly portrayed Egypt during the aforementioned phases. How did they cover Egypt's news? How did they view a rise of yet another military regime in place? What issues did they prioritize the most? What points of agreement or disagreement regarding the Egyptian Revolution and its repercussions did the two countries share?

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⁽¹⁷¹⁾Sara Said El Maghraby, (2011) M.A. Thesis. "*The Image of Muslim Communities in European Press: an Analysis of a Sample of German and British Newspapers & Magazines*," Faculty of Mass Communication, Cairo University Public Library. Furthermore, both presses resort to using six negative frames of their Muslim communities as follows: conflict, victim and culprit, conspiracy theory, threat and fear, discrimination and women subjugation. Whereas, these newspapers only depict three positive frames for their Muslim communities as experiencing peaceful living, citizenship and freedom of religion, the German newspapers; nevertheless, frame a negative image of its Muslim communities compared to British newspapers. On the other hand, some studies criticize the tendency of European media and U.S. to focus on the Middle East as an arena of conflict, extremism and violence.

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